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G. Michael Pratt, Heidelberg College, Tiffin, Ohio 44883
Position Paper:
The Battle of Fallen Timbers is presently commemorated with three monuments in a small park owned by the Ohio Historical Society. The main monument overlooks a broad flood plain and the rapids of the Maumee River, and a smaller marker lists the U.S. casualties. Also in the park is a large rock known as "Turkeyfoot Rock" which was moved to its present location from near the foot of Jerome Road, in the flood plain below. Local legends suggest that the broad flood plain was the site of much of the battle and that an Ottawa chief by the name of "Turkeyfoot" was killed while standing atop this rock in a futile attempt to rally the defeated warriors.
One source of this story is Dresden Howard, the son of an agent to the Ottawa Reservation in the early 19th century. Howard claimed he heard the story from an "old Ottawa," however, numerous journals and letters written by U.S., British, and Native American participants and witnesses contradict much of this account and suggest that the majority of the battle activity took place in the uplands and below (downstream from) the Turkeyfoot Rock area. These same sources fail to mention the incident or "Turkeyfoot." The following account of the Battle of Fallen Timbers is drawn from information contained in the attached primary sources.
On the morning of August 20, Wayne's Legion marched down river from its encampment at Roche de Bout (present Waterville, Ohio) in five parallel columns, each spaced approximately 200 yards apart. In the center column Wayne and his headquarters staff accompanied the army's artillery companies, extra ammunition and supplies, and at least some light infantry and dragoon companies. Two hundred yards on either side of this column marched the right and left wings of the army, each composed of two Sub-Legions of about 10 Infantry companies, marching by company but with the files doubled. Two hundred yards beyond each of these columns marched a flank column of Light Infantry and Riflemen. On the march, the army covered a front more than 800 yards wide. Behind the Legion rode some 1500 Kentucky militia.
The right wing marched along the crest of the valley bluff line through an "open woods" and was hampered by numerous ravines that crossed its line of march. The left wing found the ground level, but poorly drained and was hampered by dense forest and underbrush. A screen of 150 mounted Kentucky volunteers marched some 400 yards in front of two companies of regulars, who formed the front guard. These companies marched about 200 yards in front of the main columns. After marching about five miles the mounted volunteers stumbled into the center of an ambuscade line of as many as 1100 warriors. The front screen collapsed and fled around the front guard of regulars. The front guard attempted to retreat while returning fire but eventually fled the field. These troops were closely pursued by warriors intent on assaulting the main columns. The momentum of their attack was stemmed by a hastily formed Light Infantry skirmish line that forced the attacking warriors to seek shelter in an area of tornado-felled timber.
A sustained fire fight developed along this skirmish line and the Legionnaires were slowly forced back some 80 yards under the weight of superior fire. During this skirmish, the main columns deployed into line of battle. This maneuver required each company to undouble its files and move forward and obliquely to the left to form on the left of the preceding company. On the right wing, the 1st and 3rd Sub Legions formed a single line, while on the left, the 4th Sub Legion formed on the battle line, with the 2nd Sub Legion formed as a reserve. During the fifteen minutes or so that the Legion required to form, only the Light Infantry and Artillery companies in the center column joined the battle. The Artillery opened fire with shot and shell and switched to canister as the warriors pressed to within about 80 yards of their positions. As the fire fight spread along the length of the U.S. line, Dragoons were ordered to ride to the river and flank the Indian line.
This charge, lead by Capt. Robert MisCampbell, originated from the crest of the bluffs, but may have carried into the prairie below. MisCampbell was killed almost immediately and the cavalry charge quickly faltered when the troopers encountered heavy fire from concealed warriors. On the left side of the line the reserve (2nd Sub Legion) was ordered forward to extend the line and protect the left flank. Before this move could be completed, the entire Legion was ordered to charge. (The charge was little contested except on the left of the U.S. line where a party of Wyandots and elements of the Canadian "Queen's Rangers" attempted to fight a delaying action.) The Wyandots and their allies suffered heavy losses before being driven from the field. On the right, some of the Light Infantry were ordered into the flood plain, but were quickly recalled to the uplands due to their inability to get forward through the tall grass.
As the charge developed, the mounted Kentucky militia was ordered forward to extend and cover the left flank. Thus extending the battle front beyond that formed by the infantry itself. (The thick woods slowed their progress and prevented a major extension of the U.S. front, however, clearly once the charge was under way, hundreds of mounted men were moving forward on the left flank of the Legion's line.) Wayne's charge carried the army one to two miles downstream and was halted when the resistance dissipated and the charge became disorganized.
The Legion was brought to a halt, reformed and remained in a defensive posture for several hours. No Indian counter-attack developed, and after selection of a campsite, the army moved to the high ground overlooking the Foot of the Rapids and within sight of Fort Miamis and its garrison.
Although no fortifications or earthworks were established, the location and extent of the Fallen Timbers Battlefield may be determined by contemporary descriptions of the terrain and an examination of the tactical maneuvers involved.
Primary source accounts indicate the battle occurred for the most part in the wooded upland area rather than in the flood plain. Wilkinson's right wing formed its twenty companies into a single line of battle. Regulations dictated that he defend a front 800 yards wide, although being somewhat understrengthed and crowded, it is possible that his line was somewhat shortened. On the left, Hamtramck's wing initially formed a ten company front with ten companies forming in reserve. Between these two wings four artillery companies and at least two companies of Light Infantry were deployed. During the battle, the ten company reserve was ordered forward onto the left flank. Although the charge developed before this move was completed, the entire force, including the mounted militia, probably covered a wider front than the 1600 yards dictated by regulations.
Captain MisCampbell's charge originated from behind the center of the right wing and his troopers rode across a "steep ravine" behind the line and ascended a "narrow point across which troops of the right were formed" before charging to his death. Only a single ravine system exhibits this "narrow point" over which troops might be deployed and appears to match the ravine located in Wilkinson's rear. This ravine system crosses U.S. 24 about 1000 feet downstream from the Fallen Timbers Monument. From the point at the mouth of this ravine, a line approximately 1600 yards long and perpendicular to the river or U.S. 24 extends beyond the intersection of Jerome and Monclova Roads.
By locating the position of the Legion's line of battle, the site of other battlefield positions may be determined:
Finally, of the several contemporary maps of the battle, that published in Knopf's Anthony Wayne: A Name in Arms most closely conforms to the verbal descriptions of the geography and the disposition of forces. The topography and vegetation patterns on this map are as described by the journalists and also match early 19th century land survey records. The depiction of an unfinished Fort Miamis closely matches British accounts of the state of that post at the time of the battle. The location of the post-battle U.S. camp also coincides with the contemporary British and American descriptions of the site. The scale of this map is quite accurate in terms of the distances between the fort and Wayne's encampment. When applied to the disposition of the U.S. troops the map indicates the initial U.S. line extended over a mile inland and the charge covered about one mile. This map also indicates the ravine in the rear of the right wing and the point of land across which the right wing was deployed. Finally, the Indian line is indicated to extend for about two miles.
Today, the center of the U.S. battle line, the fallen timbers area and portions of the Native ambush position lie within the parcel of undeveloped land owned by the City of Toledo. The center of the parcel is heavily wooded and retains the flavor of its appearance at the time of the battle. Other areas have been developed beyond interpretation and are occupied by highways, private homes and railroad rights of way. The ravine system has been modified by the construction of U.S. 24, but appears to be relatively intact on both sides of the highway.
Although at least one large caliber musket ball has been reported from southeast of the Monclova/Jerome Road intersection, no professional archaeological surveys have been carried out in any of the upland portion of the battlefield site. However, it should be noted that some of the dead from this battle were buried where they fell and the greatest number of Legion casualties may also occur in the relatively undisturbed areas of the battlefield.
Continue to a reference list of "eyewitness" accounts.
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